A dropper is not a legal term: the word «дроппер» (“dropper”) appears neither in the current version of Federal Law No. 161-FZ “On the National Payment System” nor in Article 187 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. The Bank of Russia distinguishes two meanings: a narrow, criminal-law one — a person who, on the instructions of another person, carries out transactions using an electronic means of payment (EMP) provided to them — and a broader one, from financial monitoring practice: a bank customer whose account is used for suspicious transactions. The bank reacts to this differently depending on the situation: when a customer applies for a new electronic means of payment, information from the Bank of Russia database alone is enough for the bank to be required to refuse to conclude the agreement; for an electronic means of payment already in use, the bank is only entitled to suspend its use, and if information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) on unlawful acts is added to the information in the database, it is required to do so.
Who a Dropper Is for a Bank
The term “dropper” is a working concept of practice and of Bank of Russia materials, not a provision of law: the word «дроп» (“drop”) does not occur even once in the text of 161-FZ or of Article 187 of the Criminal Code. The Bank of Russia explicitly separates two meanings of this word.
In the Criminal Code, a dropper’s transactions are classified as the carrying out, for mercenary motives, by a customer of a money transfer operator of unlawful transactions using an electronic means of payment provided to them by the money transfer operator, on the instructions of another person and/or in that person’s interests (Article 187(4) of the Criminal Code). In the understanding of financial monitoring, the concept is broader: individuals who are bank customers and whose accounts are used for suspicious transactions (Bank of Russia material, 17 April 2026).
Source: This article is current as of 17 November 2026. Provisions are given in the version in force on that date: 161-FZ and Article 187 of the Criminal Code — from ConsultantPlus extracts of 17 November 2026; Bank of Russia materials — of 6 February 2026, 17 April 2026, 25 March 2026, and 30 September 2026, and information letters of 18 February 2026 and 25 March 2026, each with its own publication date given at first mention in the text. The details of the Bank of Russia order on the signs (No. OD-2506) are given according to publications: in the text of the order posted by the regulator, a service mark stands in place of the number and date.
Schemes: How Dropper Accounts and Cards Work
According to the Bank of Russia’s description (material of 17 April 2026, not a provision of law), a combination of signs such as the transit nature of transactions, significant volumes of P2P transfers, the concentration of transactions in short time intervals, and the absence of a salary and of payments for everyday living expenses “may indicate” that the transactions require increased attention from the bank as to whether the account is being controlled by a third party. The decision to classify transactions as suspicious is not automatic: it is checked and confirmed by an authorized bank employee.
The scale, according to the Bank of Russia: in 2024, the dropper database contained 700,000 accounts, and in 2025 — already about 1.2 million accounts (a regional Bank of Russia event, 6 February 2026); the unit here is precisely accounts, not people — one person can hold cards in several banks at once. In 2025, tens of thousands of new dropper accounts were opened every month, up to 100,000 at the peak; the lifetime of a dropper’s card shrank from several months to hours and minutes (material of 17 April 2026). Fraudsters respond to tighter controls by splitting transactions: according to the same material, one dropper can hold cards in 30–40 banks at the same time, and for each bank taken separately the activity looks relatively clean — without data exchange between banks through the Bank of Russia database, only part of this picture is visible.
A separate line of schemes is the involvement of minors. Since 1 August 2025, Article 26 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation has required the written consent of legal representatives to open an account for a customer aged 14–18; in an information letter (published 18 February 2026), the Bank of Russia recommended that banks tighten control over the presence of this consent at every account opening, explicitly linking its absence to the risk of minors being drawn in as nominee individuals (droppers). According to the same regional Bank of Russia event (6 February 2026), up to 20% of the accounts in the dropper database as of 2025 are registered to minors.
In the first half of 2026, the volume of droppers’ suspicious transactions, according to the Bank of Russia, fell by a third compared with the same period (press release of 30 September 2026) — a relative trend, with no absolute figure in that material.
The Bank of Russia Database of Transfers Without Consent
What Goes Into It
The Bank of Russia forms and maintains the “database of cases and attempts of transfers without the customer’s voluntary consent” (Article 27(5) of 161-FZ) — this is what the law calls what is colloquially known as the “droppers database.” Information enters it not only from money transfer operators: it also includes information on cases of cash being deposited without voluntary consent (from a credit institution, under Article 24.3(4) of the law on banks), on cases and attempts of concluding a consumer loan agreement without the customer’s consent (from a microfinance organization, under Article 9(11) of 151-FZ), and MVD information on unlawful acts committed, which the Bank of Russia receives under an agreement with that ministry (Article 27(8)).
Who Exchanges Information — and Why a Marketplace Is Not a Participant in the Exchange Under Article 27
Money transfer operators, payment system operators, payment infrastructure service operators, and electronic platform operators are required to send the Bank of Russia information on all cases and attempts of such transfers (Article 27(6)); in return, the same participants receive this same information from the Bank of Russia (Article 27(7)) — for receiving, the law does not formulate this as an obligation, only as an action that the participants in the exchange perform. The law itself defines what an “electronic platform” is: a financial platform or an information system in which digital financial assets are issued (Article 3(34) of 161-FZ). A marketplace is not named in this list even once — it has no ground of its own to take part in the exchange of information under Article 27, and the bank’s obligation to check a recipient against the database does not apply to a marketplace as such.
What Changes From 1 March 2027 and From 1 September 2027
The future version of 161-FZ (from 1 March 2027) introduces periods for storing information in the database: one year — when the information is included for the first time, three years — when it is included again, and separately 180 days — for information on a subscriber number. From the same date, a money transfer operator is required, when checking for signs, to use information from the state information system for countering offenses (the GIS created under Federal Law No. 41-FZ) — at present, a match with this system is only one of several signs on the recipient’s side (covered below); from 1 March 2027, taking it into account will become a mandatory step of the check. More on connecting banks to this system — in the article “How a Bank Connects to GIS Antifrod in 2026”.
From 1 September 2027, banks and money transfer operators will have a limit on the number of payment cards per customer — no more than twenty; more on this limit and on the accounting of cards — in the article “Antifrod 2.0 and 3.0: What Has Already Been Adopted and What Is Being Discussed”. From the same date, the Bank of Russia database will also begin to include cases of transactions with digital currencies without the customer’s voluntary consent, received from digital currency exchangers and digital depositories.
What a Bank Is Required and Entitled to Do With a Recipient From the Database
The modality here differs between parts of one and the same article, and it must not be confused.
| Situation | What the bank does | Provision |
|---|---|---|
| A customer applies for a new EMP, and information about them is already in the database | Is required to refuse to conclude an agreement on the use of the EMP, immediately informing the customer of the reason | Article 9(2.1) of 161-FZ |
| An EMP already in use, information in the database, no MVD data on unlawful acts | Is entitled to suspend the use of the EMP for the period during which the information remains in the database | Article 9(11.6) of 161-FZ |
| The same, but the bank has not exercised the right to suspend | May continue transfers on the instruction of a customer who is an individual in favor of recipients who are individuals, but no more than ₽100,000 per month | Article 9(11.6) of 161-FZ |
| An EMP already in use, information in the database, and there is MVD information on unlawful acts | Is required to suspend the use of the EMP for the entire period during which the information remains in the database | Article 9(11.7) of 161-FZ |
What is suspended is the electronic means of payment — a card, access to remote banking services: the law speaks precisely of the EMP, these provisions do not concern the bank account, and the wording “account blocking” does not match the provision in this context.
After a suspension, the bank is required to notify the customer immediately and to inform them of the right to submit to the Bank of Russia an application to exclude the information — including through the bank itself or through the Bank of Russia’s online reception (Article 9(11.8)); the bank is also entitled to send the Bank of Russia its own reasoned application that the inclusion was unjustified, if it has grounds for this (Part 11.9). The decision is made within a period not exceeding 15 business days, a refusal can be appealed in court (Part 11.10), and after the information is excluded, the bank is required to resume the use of the EMP immediately (Part 11.11). The Bank of Russia recommends that banks inform the customer right away of the reason for the restriction, the legal basis, and the way to have the information excluded from the database — in an information letter published on 25 March 2026.
The law describes the procedure for notification of suspension and for exclusion of information (Article 9(11.8)–(11.11)) in terms of the “customer,” without dividing this procedure by the customer’s status. The only difference by status in this part of Article 9 is the ₽100,000 limit when the right to suspend has not been exercised: it applies only to transfers by a customer who is an individual in favor of recipients who are individuals (Part 11.6, see the table above).
Separately — the liability of the bank itself: if it has properly fulfilled the requirements for checking for signs and for suspension, it is not liable to the customer for losses arising as a result of such fulfillment (Article 8(3.14) of 161-FZ).
Signs: What the Bank Checks on a Transfer and What Is Visible at Onboarding
On a transfer, the payer’s bank is required to check for signs of a transfer without the customer’s consent before the funds are debited or before the instruction is accepted for execution (Article 8(3.1) of 161-FZ); the signs themselves are established by the Bank of Russia and posted on its website — by Bank of Russia Order OD-2506 (details according to publications), in force since 1 January 2026. On the recipient’s side — where this is especially significant for the topic of droppers — the signs include: a match of the recipient with information from the Bank of Russia database (paragraph 1.1 of the appendix to the order); a match with information from the state information system for countering offenses created under 41-FZ — this sign has applied since 1 March 2026 (paragraph 1.2); a match of the parameters of a device from which a transfer without consent was previously made (paragraph 1.5); a match of the recipient with the bank’s own internal lists (paragraph 1.7); and a criminal case opened against the recipient, confirmed by documents (paragraph 1.8). A separate sign (paragraph 1.12) describes a specific chain: receipt into an individual’s account via the Faster Payments System (SBP) of more than ₽200,000 from that same person’s account in another bank less than 24 hours before a transfer is sent to a new recipient to whom there have been no transfers in the previous six months. The simplification “a transfer to yourself of ₽200,000 or more is already a sign” does not match this condition: without the other elements of the chain, a single large transfer to one’s own account does not fall under paragraph 1.12.
At onboarding, the law also has direct points: refusal to conclude an EMP agreement based on information from the database (Article 9(2.1), already covered above) and the mandatory written consent of legal representatives when opening an account for a customer aged 14–18 (Article 26 of the Civil Code, with tightened control on the Bank of Russia’s recommendation). The other signals that banks and platforms use at entry — matching devices and phone numbers across different applications, behavioral features when filling in a form — have no regulatory source: this is the anti-fraud practice of individual services, not a requirement of the regulator.
Liability of the Dropper and the Recruiter
Article 187 of the Criminal Code (Parts 3–6 were introduced by Federal Law No. 176-FZ of 24 June 2025) separates two different participants in the scheme.
The bank’s customer is liable under two parts: transferring, for mercenary motives, their EMP or access to it to another person for unlawful transactions (Part 3), and such a customer carrying out unlawful transactions on the instructions of another person, in the absence of signs of the crime provided for by Article 172 of the Criminal Code (Part 4). The sanction under both parts is the same: a fine of ₽100,000 to ₽300,000 or in the amount of the convicted person’s income for a period of three months to one year, or compulsory labor of up to 480 hours, or correctional labor of up to two years, or restriction of liberty for the same term, or forced labor of up to three years, or imprisonment for the same term.
Someone who is not a party to the EMP agreement — a recruiter, a buyer — is liable more severely: acquiring or transferring someone else’s EMP for mercenary motives for unlawful transactions (Part 5) is punishable by a fine of ₽300,000 to ₽1 million or in the amount of income for a period of one to three years, or forced labor of up to four years, or imprisonment of up to six years with a fine of ₽100,000 to ₽500,000 or in the amount of income for a period of one to two years, or without one. Carrying out an unlawful transaction themselves, also in the absence of signs of Article 172 (Part 6), is punishable by forced labor of up to five years with a fine of ₽300,000 to ₽1 million or in the amount of income for a period of one to three years, or without one, or imprisonment of up to six years with a fine of ₽300,000 to ₽1 million or in the amount of income for a period of one to three years, or without one, and with restriction of liberty for up to two years or without it.
Note 4 to the article grants a bank customer who has committed a crime under Part 3 or 4 for the first time release from criminal liability — but only if they actively contributed to the detection or investigation of the crime and voluntarily reported other persons who committed crimes using the same EMP.
What a Company and a Platform Should Do
For money transfer operators — banks and similar organizations — the set of obligations has already been described above: checking for signs on a transfer, reacting to information from the database, notifying the customer, the path to exclusion. For other companies and platforms — customers of such operators — the set of actions is built on something else: 161-FZ does not impose obligations on them directly, and the following analysis answers the question of where other people’s money actually passes through the company itself.
A company or platform acts as a payer every time it transfers money to contractors or to counterparties under agency schemes, makes refunds, or makes other settlements with third parties — and the recipient of any such transfer may turn out to be a person from the Bank of Russia database. In the event of the loss of an electronic means of payment and/or its use without voluntary consent, the paying company, as a customer, is required to send a notification about this to its bank in the form provided for by the agreement — immediately after detection, but no later than the day following the day on which it receives from the bank a notification of the completed transaction (Article 9(11)); having received such a notification from a customer that is a legal entity after the funds have already been debited, the bank servicing the company is required to immediately notify the recipient’s bank to suspend the crediting (Part 11.1). If the crediting to the recipient has not yet taken place, the recipient’s bank suspends it for up to five business days and notifies the recipient of the need to submit documents confirming that the receipt of the funds is justified (Part 11.2). If the recipient submits such documents within this period, the bank credits the money to them (Part 11.3); if not, no later than two business days after the five-day period expires, it returns the money to the payer’s bank, and that bank, no later than two days, credits it back to the company (Part 11.4). If the notification of suspension arrives after the money has already been credited to the recipient, the recipient’s bank informs the payer’s bank that it is impossible to suspend the crediting (Part 11.5).
One more point that concerns any transfer by a paying company, regardless of this procedure, is the check for signs by the bank itself before the funds are debited: a match of the recipient with information from the Bank of Russia database is one of these signs (Article 8(3.1), paragraph 1.1 of the appendix to the order, covered above). The same case from a different angle — in the article “Blocking Under 161-FZ for Companies and Individual Entrepreneurs: What the Bank Suspends, How the Bank of Russia Database Works, and How to Get Out of It”.
At entry — when selecting a contractor, a counterparty, or a platform customer — banks and platforms also use signals without a regulatory source: matching devices and phone numbers across different applications, behavioral features when filling in a form. For a company, the logic is the same: such signals are the approach of a specific anti-fraud service, not a requirement of the Bank of Russia.
When a specific signal has been triggered — on a single transfer or with respect to a single customer — the company does not have the bank’s right to refuse or suspend an EMP: that remains with money transfer operators. The practical step for the company itself is, within the limits of the agreement with the counterparty, to suspend precisely this transaction or this service pending an additional check, to request supporting documents from the recipient, and to cross-check with its own anti-fraud tools — without trying to block the account or the agreement as a whole by analogy with a bank.
If a company or platform has itself received a notification of a restriction from its bank, on the Bank of Russia’s recommendation (letter of 25 March 2026) the bank informs it of the reason for the restriction, the legal basis, and the path to having the information excluded from the database on its own initiative, without waiting for a request — this is how the Bank of Russia recommends that banks act with any customer whose transactions have been restricted.
A practical path for a company’s own checks is anti-fraud tools: the anti-fraud check platform for banks and companies, which also includes monitoring of customer transactions — more on it in the article on KYT.
The NeuroVision anti-fraud platform helps banks and companies check customers and counterparties against state databases and their own risk models — passport validity, signs of suspicious activity, screening against lists, and transaction monitoring in a single service.
The retelling of the provisions is simplified; this is not a legal opinion. The exact text is at the links to the sources; the versions were checked as of 17 November 2026.
Conclusion
“Dropper” combines a narrow criminal-law understanding and a broader financial-monitoring one, but neither the bank nor the company acts on this word directly — they act on a specific part of Article 9 or 27 of 161-FZ, and each part has its own degree of obligation: in some cases the bank is required to refuse or suspend, in others it is only entitled to. Companies and platforms that are not themselves money transfer operators do not get direct access to the Bank of Russia database; the value of the topic for them lies in understanding what stands behind a bank’s notification of a restriction and what happens to the company’s own payment if the recipient turns out to be in the database.