Step 1
A photo of the page with the picture
The camera captures the spread with the photo. The service recognises the fields and the machine-readable zone and verifies its check digits — the MRZ yields the key to access the chip.
Passport NFC chip check
Passport NFC chip check in the mobile SDK: the customer holds a foreign passport or an ID card to the phone, and the service reads the chip, verifies the signature of the issuing country, rejects a cloned chip and matches the chip photo to a selfie. No NFC? The check runs on the document photo and the MRZ.
Chip read Russian foreign passport · 10 years
- Country signature valid Issuing country signature is valid
- Clone protection passed Chip is not cloned
- Photo and selfie match Chip photo matches the selfie
- Result match Chip data = MRZ: Ozolin Fotiy Ignatyevich
- A state signature, not just an image
- Protection against a cloned chip
- No NFC — photo, MRZ and selfie
Data is stored in Russia Russian Software Registry No. 19972 Compliance with 152-FZ
Passport chip check: why a state signature is more trustworthy than a page image
The chip does not replace recognition — it strengthens it
Document recognition looks for traces of forgery in the image. A biometric passport has a second source — the chip, where the country stored the data and the holder’s photo and signed them with its key. Such a signature cannot be forged without the country’s key.
Chip data is compared with the MRZ and the visual zone, and the chip photo with the selfie. Any mismatch is visible at once.
- 01
Data from the primary source
Full name, date of birth, number and expiry date are read from the chip, not recognised from an image. Glare, a bent corner and poor light do not affect them.
- 02
A signature that cannot be redrawn
The data hashes in the chip are signed with the issuing country’s certificate. Change a single letter and the signature no longer matches — the check shows it.
- 03
The holder’s photo, unaltered
The chip photo was written when the document was issued. A replaced photo on the page or a morph of two faces does not change it.
- 04
A genuine chip, not a copy
Active chip authentication shows that the original chip is responding, not a copy of its data written to another card.
- 2 sources — the chip and the document page
- 16 000+ document types by photo
- 195+ countries and territories
Reading a passport chip in an app: six steps from the MRZ to the server response
This is what the “Document with a chip” step looks like in the SDK for iOS and Android — from a page photo to the check result on your server. How the machine-readable zone and its check digits work is described on the page MRZ reading.
Step 2
“Hold the passport to the phone”
The screen shows where the phone’s NFC antenna is and how to place the passport. It’s better to remove the case and put the passport and phone on a table, not hold them in the air.
Step 3
A secure channel to the chip
The SDK opens the chip using the PACE protocol, or BAC for older chips. Without the MRZ data the chip gives nothing away: a passport in a bag cannot be read from a distance.
Step 4
Data, photo and signature
The chip yields the MRZ data group (DG1), the holder’s digital photo (DG2) and the document security object (SOD) with the country’s signature.
Step 5
Chip checks and the selfie
The hashes and signature are checked against the country’s certificate, and the chip is tested for cloning. Then a selfie with Liveness: a live person and a one-time match with the chip photo.
Step 6
The result goes to your server
The status of each check, the chip data and any mismatches with the MRZ arrive by webhook or on a session status request. Your system makes the decision about the customer.
Six e-passport checks: from the access key to the holder’s face
Each check answers its own question. Results arrive for each one separately — you see not only “passed” but also what exactly did not match.
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Chip access
The key from the MRZ opens the secure channel. If it does not open, the MRZ on the page is not from this chip or was recognised with an error.
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Data integrity
The hash of each data group read is compared with the hash in the document security object. A modified record in the chip will not pass.
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Issuing country signature
The security object signature is verified along the certificate chain up to the country’s root certificate. A revoked or unknown certificate is grounds for rejection.
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Chip is not cloned
The chip proves that it holds a private key that cannot be copied. A copy of the data on another card will not pass this check.
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Holder’s face
The chip photo is compared with the selfie once in this check; Liveness confirms that a live person is in front of the camera, not a photo, a screen or a mask.
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Chip = page
Chip data is compared with the MRZ and the recognised visual zone: surname, number, dates. A mismatch reveals an edited page.
Which passports and ID cards are read by NFC and which by photo only
- New-style foreign passport, 10 years
Biometric foreign passport: a chip symbol on the cover, and a photo without a hologram or ornament on the spread. - Old-style foreign passport, 5 years
No chip: the photo page and the MRZ are recognised from an image. - Russian internal passport
The booklet has no electronic carrier. The passport is recognised from a photo, and the MRZ is checked against its check digits.
- E-passport
An ICAO-standard passport with a chip and an e-document symbol on the cover. - Passport without a chip
Recognised from a photo from the list of documents of 195+ countries and territories.
- ID card with a chip
A TD1-format card with a chip: in some countries the electronic ID card is the main document. - Residence permit and resident card with a chip
If the document has an ICAO-standard chip, it is read in the same way as a passport. - Card without a chip
Both sides are recognised from a photo; the reverse side is free.
- Phone without NFC
The flow offers to continue with the document photo and a selfie. - A check in the browser
A browser cannot access the passport chip: on a website it is photo, MRZ and Liveness. - Chip damaged or not responding
A passport with a faulty chip is still a document: the decision follows your rules. - Foreign or outdated certificate
The signature cannot be verified without the country’s certificate — a “not confirmed” status goes into the response.
- Not every document has a chip. The flow determines the document type itself and asks to hold it to the phone only when it has a chip.
- “NFC + photo” — the chip is read and matched with the page; “Photo and MRZ” — a check from an image, as on the page passport recognition; “Your rule” — what to do with the customer is decided by your flow.
- The list of documents by country is on the page foreign documents.
Passport NFC verification in the flow: mandatory, optional or photo only
The mode is set in the flow editor: different for different products and risk levels. The other check steps do not change.
- Enable
NFC optional
the chip if there is one, otherwise a photo
When to choose it
- mass onboarding
- customers with different documents and phones
What the customer sees
- a prompt to hold the passport to the phone
- a “Continue with a photo” button if reading fails
- Enable
NFC mandatory
without a chip the check fails
When to choose it
- high risk: large limits, foreign customers, signing services
- documents with a chip only
What the customer sees
- a screen showing where the antenna is
- retry on a read failure
- rejection without a chip, with a clear reason
- Enable
Photo only
website, WebView, documents without a chip
When to choose it
- check in the browser
- Russian internal passport
- phones without NFC
What the customer sees
- page capture, MRZ, selfie and Liveness — as in passport and selfie check
Morphing, a replaced photo, a cloned chip: what the digital signature gives away
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Morph of two faces
The photo on the page blends two faces so that both people can pass with the passport. The chip holds the holder’s original photo, and the second person’s selfie will not match it.
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A replaced photo and an edited page
A new photo or a corrected date on the page does not change the chip. Chip and page data diverge — the check shows in which field.
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A fake chip
A chip with written data but no country signature, or signed with an unknown certificate, fails the chain check up to the root certificate.
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A copy of someone else’s chip
The data of a genuine passport written to another chip passes the signature check but fails the clone check: the chip’s private key cannot be copied.
Some forgeries are clearly visible in an image, others only in the chip. Above is where the chip check adds what image analysis lacks.
The chip does not tell whether a passport is valid right now: a stolen or cancelled document with a genuine chip will pass the signature check. The validity of a Russian passport is checked against the Ministry of Interior database — on the page authenticity check. Video stream substitution at the selfie step is covered by deepfake protection.
Who needs the chip, not just a photo: foreign customers, signing, rental, telecom
Where a mistake in a customer’s identity is costly and customers more often arrive with a biometric passport.
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Banks and brokers
- Foreign customers and Russians with a foreign passport: the form data comes from the chip, not from an image.
- Example: Foreign passport → form
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E-signature services
- A flow where identity is confirmed with a foreign passport with an electronic carrier. How this works for a qualified e-signature is described on the page for certification authorities.
- Example: Foreign passport with a chip
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Crypto and payment services
- Foreign customers from countries where the electronic ID card is an ordinary document.
- Example: ID card with a chip
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Car sharing and rental
- A valuable asset goes to a person whose identity is confirmed by the country’s signature.
- Example: Passport + selfie
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Telecom operators
- Issuing a SIM card to a foreigner in an app — without a visit to a store.
- Example: Foreigner’s passport
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Hotels and tour operators
- The guest’s passport — from the chip before arrival, with no typos in Latin letters.
- Example: Guest’s foreign passport
The chip photo and the law: biometric consent, Federal Law 63‑FZ and data in Russia
Consent before the face match
The chip photo is biometric data
Under Part 1 of Article 11 of Federal Law 152‑FZ, biometrics for establishing identity may only be processed with written consent. The consent screen is built into the flow before the selfie.
A one-time match
Not for repeat recognition
The chip photo is compared with the selfie within this check. It is not used to recognise the customer by face again: next time — the document and Liveness again.
The law already trusts the chip
Chip data is recognised by Federal Law 63‑FZ
Under Clause 1 of Part 1 of Article 18 of Federal Law 63‑FZ, a certification authority may identify a citizen without personal presence using a foreign passport with an electronic carrier.
Databases in Russia
The NeuroVision cloud is in Russia
Under Part 5 of Article 18 of Federal Law 152‑FZ, the data of Russian citizens is stored, when collected, in databases located in Russia. The NeuroVision cloud is in Russia, and there is an installation in your environment.
The data operator is your company
A guideline, not a legal opinion
This is guidance, not a legal opinion; your company remains the personal data operator. The session data retention period is set in the flow.
152‑FZ
a Russian developer, software in the registry, No. 19972
How much a document check with a chip costs
Chip reading is added to the regular document and face check in the same session. Payment is per KYC session, with no subscription fee. The first month of testing is free.
Calculate the cost- 01
From 16 ₽ per session — the “Document” package: recognition, MRZ with check-digit validation and page anti-fraud
- 02
From 29 ₽ — “Document + Liveness”: plus Liveness and a face match against the document photo
- 03
The NFC module is on request: the price depends on the volume and the flow mode
How to connect NFC: the SDK for iOS and Android, and photo and MRZ on the web
Reading the chip requires an app on a phone with NFC. For a website and customers without such a phone, the same flow works from a photo.
- NFC and camera permission
- The “hold the passport” screen in the SDK
- Without NFC — by photo
- Test flow and documentation
Terms
Test access for 1 month, a personal manager, support under contract, pay only for checks.
E-passport glossary: eMRTD, SOD, CSCA, PACE
- E-passport
- A passport or ID card with a contactless chip under ICAO Doc 9303. In Russia — the new-style foreign passport.
- eMRTD
- NFC
- Communication at a distance of a few centimetres. The phone uses it to read the chip of a document held against it.
- near field communication
- Data group
- A section of chip memory. DG1 repeats the MRZ, DG2 stores the holder’s digital photo.
- data group, DG
- Document security object
- A record in the chip with the hashes of the data groups and the issuing country’s signature.
- SOD
- Passive authentication
- A check that the chip data is unaltered and signed by the country that issued the document.
- Passive Authentication
- Country root certificate
- The certificate with which a country signs the document signer certificates (DSC).
- CSCA
- ICAO public key directory
- The source of country certificates and revocation lists for verifying chip signatures.
- ICAO PKD
- Active authentication
- A check that the original chip is responding: it proves possession of a private key that cannot be copied.
- Active / Chip Authentication
- Chip access protocol
- Opening a secure channel with a key from the MRZ. PACE is newer and stronger, BAC is for older chips.
- PACE, BAC
- Morphing
- Blending two faces into one photo so that both people can use the document.
- face morphing
We will test chip reading on your documents
Tell us which documents your customers bring and whether you have a mobile app, — we will build a flow with the chip and a fallback to photo and give you test access for 1 month.
Can't put your request into words? Book a call and our team will contact you at a convenient time
Book a call
The company is included in the register of IT companies and the register of personal data operators of the Russian Ministry of Digital Development.
Address: Moscow, Presnenskaya Embankment 12 — Moscow City business centre, Federation Tower. Nearest metro stations: Delovoy Tsentr and Mezhdunarodnaya.
Read also
On document checks and forgery detection — in our blog
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Frequently asked questions about passport NFC chip checks
Answers on chip reading, limitations, the signature and cost
It is reading the electronic chip of a foreign passport or an ID card with a phone and verifying its data: the issuing country’s signature, clone protection and the match of the chip photo with a selfie. It complements document recognition from a photo.
First the photo page is captured: the MRZ yields the access key. Then the customer holds the passport to the phone, and the SDK opens a secure channel over PACE or BAC and reads the data, photo and signature.
No. NFC reads the new-style 10-year foreign passport and foreign e-passports and ID cards. The internal passport is checked from a photo and the MRZ.
No: a browser cannot access the passport chip. The chip is read in an app with the SDK for iOS or Android. On a website the flow checks the document from a photo, the MRZ, a selfie and Liveness.
In “optional” mode the flow offers to continue with the document photo and a selfie. In “mandatory” mode such a customer will not pass the chip check — the decision on them stays with your rules.
That the data and photo were written by the country that issued the document and have not been changed since. The clone check additionally shows that the original chip is responding, not a copy.
No. A stolen or cancelled passport with a genuine chip will pass the signature check. The validity of a Russian passport is checked separately against the Ministry of Interior database — 5 ₽ per request.
The chip photo is compared with the selfie within a single check. We do not recognise the customer by face again: next time — the document and Liveness again. The session data retention period is set in the flow.
The photo check looks for traces of editing in the image. The chip adds what the image does not show: morphing, a replaced photo with good printing, a fake chip. For high risk both sources are useful.
The “Document” package — from 16 ₽ per session, “Document + Liveness” — from 29 ₽. The NFC module is on request, and the first month of testing is free.
