Microprinting is a way of applying text in so small a point size that the line cannot be made out with the naked eye and merges into a solid line or a background pattern; when copied or scanned, such text is usually lost or turns into an illegible blot. In the official description of the passport blank, the words «микропечать» (microprinting), «микротекст» (microtext), and «микрошрифт» (microfont) do not appear even once — but this does not mean the element is absent: the description lists the document’s appearance, while the requirements for its manufacture are set by another act, and there microtext is named directly and is mandatory.
Next: which security features the official description of the blank actually names, which of them can be seen during inspection and what that requires — transmitted light, ultraviolet, or a change of angle — how forensic examination differs from ordinary inspection, and what to do if a passport raises doubts. Checking a passport breaks down into three different questions — the authenticity of the blank, the validity of the document, and whether it belongs to the person presenting it — and each has its own check: inspection, a request to the MVD register, and matching the face against the photograph. They should not be mixed: an authentic blank can be an invalid document, and a correct response from the register says nothing about its physical authenticity.
What Microprinting in a Passport Is
The Russian-language query «микропечать это в паспорте» (“microprinting in a passport, what is it”) is the most frequent one on this topic. In search results for it, links still more often point to the description of the passport blank under Resolution No. 828 of 8 July 1997, which lost force on 23 December 2023 and was declared repealed by the annex to Government Resolution No. 2267. The current text gives the same result as the previous one: the words «микропечать», «микротекст», and «микрошрифт» are not in it either. The absence of the term from the text of the description says nothing about the blank itself: the description answers the question of how the document looks, not to which requirements it is manufactured. The answer lies in another act.
There is an explanation for this in the regulatory framework itself, and it also settles the question. Government Resolution No. 1788 of 5 November 2020 defines “forgery-protected printed products” as products that have two or more protection elements, and a “protection element against forgery” as a structural element that makes it possible to establish the authenticity of the product and to make its forgery impossible, difficult, or economically unprofitable. There are four security levels — “A”, “B”, “V”, and “G” (Russian «А», «Б», «В», «Г»). The passport blank is assigned to the highest, “A” (Resolution No. 2267, paragraph 1), and the technical requirements for the levels themselves are approved by the Ministry of Finance of Russia — by Order No. 217n of 29 September 2020. And it is there that microtext is named: the graphic composition of products of levels “A”, “B”, and “V” must include it (paragraph 30), and for level “A” it must be both positive and negative, with a character height of no more than 200 and 250 microns respectively (paragraph 37). This requirement is continuous: the same element was also mandatory under the previous Ministry of Finance Order No. 14n of 7 February 2003, which was in force until 2021.
It is important to understand the boundary of this provision. It is addressed to the manufacturer and says what the blank must be — it does not describe where exactly on a particular passport to look for the microtext and what state it is in after ten years in a pocket. Where it is located, the regulations do not disclose: under the same Resolution No. 1788, what is closed is not the protection elements but “highly protected, hard-to-reproduce production technologies, information about which is confidential”. The list of requirements for level “A” is open; what is closed is how they are fulfilled.
An industry source — a publication by Ultramag, a manufacturer of document authenticity control devices (BNTI, 2011) — indicates the location: the lines for entering personal data on the second and third pages of the blank are made of microtext, distinguishable only when magnified with a loupe. This element should not be confused with the ornamental word «Россия» (“Russia”) on the odd-numbered pages (Resolution No. 2267, paragraph 16) — that is a different element, visible without magnification.
What Other Security Features a Russian Passport Has
The passport blank is 88 × 125 mm, 20 pages, 14 of which carry numbering in an ornamental design, duplicated in the center of the page in the background grid. The official description of the blank (Resolution No. 2267) lists the security features by page sections. The paper from which the blank is made contains three types of security fibers — their colors are not named in the act. On the inner pages there is a common watermark which, when viewed against the light, shows the three-dimensional outlines of the letters «РФ» (“RF”). A metallized thread that changes color depending on the viewing angle is introduced into the paper of the nineteenth and twentieth pages; individual sections of it are visible on the surface of the nineteenth page. Along the entire length of the spine, the blank is sewn with a two-color thread with a dotted glow under ultraviolet radiation — this is the only ultraviolet element the act names.
The series and number are produced in two ways: at the top of the second and third pages — by letterpress printing, and at the bottom of pages five through twenty, on the back endpaper, and on the cover — by laser perforation: the digits form holes, visible against the light, that a laser burns into the paper and the binding material. The text and the typographic “rosette” pattern on the first page are made by intaglio (metallographic) printing; the details «Российская Федерация» (“Russian Federation”), «Паспорт выдан» (“Passport issued by”), the date of issue, and the subdivision code are applied to the second page by offset printing.
The third page carries the main protection of personal data. The place for the 35 × 45 mm photograph is marked by corners, and two rectangular black registration marks serve to position the printer when the blank is filled in — once the photograph is glued correctly, the marks are visually indistinguishable. This is a technological element, not a security one: the function of the marks is to help the printer when filling in the blank, and the official description does not attribute to them any role in checking authenticity. Their visibility after the passport has been issued indicates a defect in the placement of the photograph — this defect by itself does not indicate a forged blank. The page itself is laminated at high temperature with a film bearing a holographic image, and in the upper right corner there is an element in the form of a circle with the letters «РФ», which changes color from purple to green depending on the viewing angle. This concentration is explained by the composition of the page: it is here that the photograph, the personal data, and the machine-readable zone are brought together — three elements, and substituting any of them changes the content of the document.
From the general design: the cover, made of wear-resistant dark red material, bears the gold embossed State Emblem without a shield; on the front endpaper — an image of the Moscow Kremlin and a typographic rosette; on pages five, seven, nine, eleven, thirteen, fifteen, and nineteen, the word «Россия» is printed in stylized letters in an ornamental design — the act directly describes it as a visible element, not as a hidden image. Separately, the Regulations allow that “specially developed sewn-in or inserted elements may be used” in the blank (paragraph 16) — but this provision is permissive and does not confirm a single specific element beyond those already listed.
The security set of the passport blank has not changed since 2006: the fibers, watermark, metallized thread, laser perforation, holographic film, and «РФ» element listed above appeared in the description at the same time, with the passports that began to be issued on 1 March 2007 (Resolution No. 779 of 20 December 2006). Blanks of the previous design were lawfully used alongside the new ones until 1 January 2008 — a passport issued in autumn 2007 may well be on an old blank. From 1 July 2011, passports began to be issued with a completed machine-readable zone (Resolution No. 424 of 27 May 2011) — earlier passports lack this zone while remaining lawful documents. Resolution No. 2267 of 23 December 2023 changed the name and structure of the Regulations on the Passport, but not the security set of the blank itself: “the new 2023 passport” means new Regulations, not a new blank. There are only two substantive differences between the new description and the previous one, which has lost force — the level “A” qualification appeared and the mentions of the insert disappeared; the wording of the security features themselves coincides almost word for word. The microtext requirement is not new: it was in force under the previous technical requirements of the Ministry of Finance too, since 2003, that is, it covers the entire period during which the current blank has been issued. From 1 January 2026, the TIN mark in the blank is replaced by a mark with the number of the record in the unified federal information register.
Signs of a Forged Passport: What to Check During Inspection
Before moving on to the elements, it is worth understanding what inspection itself gives. It makes it possible to compare the document with the official description of the passport blank and to notice a discrepancy — no more than that: if no discrepancies are found, this means that none were noticed among the elements available without equipment — not that the blank is authentic. A positive conclusion about authenticity is given only by a separate study — a technical forensic examination of documents. It is conducted by the forensic units of the internal affairs bodies (MVD Order No. 511 of 29 June 2005, Appendix No. 2, paragraph 22.1), as well as by forensic institutions of the Ministry of Justice of Russia, where the same type is called technical examination of documents (Ministry of Justice Order No. 72 of 20 April 2023), and by the expert units of other agencies; under Article 41 of Federal Law No. 73-FZ of 31 May 2001, such an examination may also be conducted outside state forensic institutions if it is ordered within a case — it is not on the list of types reserved exclusively for state organizations. The law proceeds from the same premise: it ties the legal consequences for a passport’s status to the establishment of a fact by an authorized body in a prescribed manner (Article 9(8) of 138-FZ), not to the opinion of the person to whom the document was presented.
| Inspection of the document | Automated check from a photo | Forensic examination of the document | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who performs it | The person to whom the passport is presented | A recognition system working from a photograph or scan | A forensic expert — in a state forensic institution (MVD, Ministry of Justice, and others) or outside one |
| Subject | The passport blank itself, in hand | An image of the document | The document, its details, and the means of its manufacture |
| What it allows | Comparing the blank with the description, noticing a mismatch | Checking the data and the MRZ, finding traces of image editing, comparing the face | Establishing how the document was made |
| What it does not allow | Confirming authenticity positively | Assessing physical security features — they need transmitted light, ultraviolet, and a change of angle, which an image does not create | — |
| Conclusion it can legitimately reach | “Matches the description” or “there are grounds for doubt” | “The data are consistent” or “discrepancies found” | A conclusion about how the document was made, with evidentiary value |
| Legal significance | Grounds for further action; does not affect the passport’s status | The same | Grounds for an authorized body to establish the fact |
The procedure below suits both a customer verification specialist and someone who simply has another person’s passport in hand — a realtor, an HR officer, a landlord. It describes precisely the first level — inspection — and requires different conditions for different elements. Against the light, the «РФ» watermark and the laser-perforated holes of the series and number are checked. When the viewing angle changes — the circle with the letters «РФ» on the third page, the metallized thread on the nineteenth and twentieth pages, and the holographic image of the film. An ultraviolet lamp is needed for only one element — the dotted glow of the thread with which the spine is sewn. Without any equipment, during ordinary inspection in hand, the following are visible: the size and number of pages, the ornamental numbering and the background grid, the dark red cover, the Kremlin and the rosette on the endpaper, the corners and the edge of the film at the photograph, the machine-readable zone, and the word «Россия» on the odd-numbered pages.
None of these features on its own proves forgery if it looks unusual or is missing. The absence of a machine-readable record in a passport issued before 1 July 2011 is a lawful norm, not a reason for suspicion. A blank that “doesn’t match” pictures from the internet is most likely being compared against the description in the repealed Resolution No. 828 or against an unofficial source. Wear, abrasions, and creases are an independent ground for replacing the document (Article 9(8), item 4, of Federal Law No. 138-FZ of 28 April 2023), but by themselves do not indicate a forged blank. The common rule that “the subdivision code must match the region of the series” has no regulatory confirmation. Visible registration marks on the third page indicate a defect in how the photograph was placed, not a forgery. Marks and entries not provided for by the Regulations are directly prohibited (paragraph 9 of Section I) and may lead to replacement of the passport — this, too, is a defect in completion, not proof that the blank is forged. The composition of the security set available for checking differs by year of issue — a conclusion about the blank is drawn from the totality of elements, not from the presence or absence of any single one.
What a Passport Photo Shows and What Can Only Be Seen in Person
Most of the passport blank’s security features are designed for physical contact with the document and cannot be reliably assessed from a smartphone photograph — even a good one. The point is not the camera resolution: the very nature of these elements requires conditions that a static shot cannot create. Optically variable features by definition require a change of viewing angle; the watermark and laser perforation can be read only against the light, not in the reflected light that illuminates an ordinary shot; the glow of the spine stitching thread registers only with an ultraviolet lamp, which a smartphone camera in normal mode does not perceive. The fact that an automated verification system recognized a photograph of a passport and read its data does not mean that it also confirmed the authenticity of the blank’s physical security features: these are different checks with different boundaries, and for specialists who check counterparties and customers this boundary matters more than the list of elements itself — it determines what conclusion can be drawn from a submitted photograph of a document at all.
| Element | What is needed to assess it | Visible in person | Visible in an ordinary photo |
|---|---|---|---|
| «РФ» watermark | Transmitted light (against the light) | Yes | No |
| Security fibers in the paper | Partly — visible fibers can be made out | Partly | Not reliably |
| Metallized thread (pages 19–20) | A change of viewing angle | Yes | No |
| Laser perforation of the series and number | Transmitted light | Yes | No |
| Holographic film on the third page | Tilting, integrity of the edge | Yes | Partly — glare gets into the frame, the hologram itself cannot be verified |
| «РФ» element (purple → green) | A change of viewing angle | Yes | No |
| Spine stitching thread | An ultraviolet lamp | Yes, with a lamp | No |
| Machine-readable zone | — (lawfully absent from passports issued before 1 July 2011) | Yes | Yes, it lends itself best to automated checking |
The opposite is what checks well from a photograph: the consistency of the machine-readable zone with the visual data, the format and composition of the details, the geometry of the layout, traces of digital editing of the image, and matching the face against a selfie. This is a different task — recognizing and analyzing an image of the document, not inspecting the blank’s physical security features. It is covered in detail in the article “How KYC Systems Detect Forged Documents” and in the article “Anti-Fraud in Document Verification: How to Detect Forgeries and Traces of Editing”.
How the MRZ Helps Detect a Forged Passport
The machine-readable zone (MRZ) is two lines of 44 characters each in the lower quarter of the third page, generated by the algorithm in Appendix No. 24 to MVD Order No. 773 of 16 November 2020 (the document is in force, but it will lose force on 31 March 2027 — it will be replaced by MVD Order No. 540 of 3 August 2026, which had not yet entered into force on the date of the article’s publication). Check digits in strictly defined positions of the record make it possible to detect a reading or data entry error — this is an integrity check of the record itself, not a check of the document’s authenticity. The detailed algorithm for calculating them is not covered in this article: it gives too many technical details for open publication and is covered in detail in a separate article, “Passport machine-readable zone verification: how the MRZ helps detect forgeries in KYC”.
A correct MRZ does not by itself prove that the passport blank is authentic, for three reasons. The record is applied by a printer according to a published algorithm: a correct result shows a correct calculation, not the origin of the blank. The MRZ duplicates the data of the visual zone of the same page — it confirms that two parts of one document are consistent with each other, not that the document exists in any register. And most importantly, the zone is not present on all passports and does not cover the document’s validity period. It began to be filled in only on 1 July 2011, and the absence of an MRZ on a passport issued earlier is a lawful norm, not a sign of forgery. And the MRZ of the internal passport has no expiry date: the positions reserved for it are filled with filler characters, because the passport’s validity period depends on the holder’s age and is not recorded separately in the record. Hence the practical conclusion: a passport that has expired by its holder’s age gives a fully correct machine-readable record — it confirms only the internal consistency of the data, not the age or the validity period of the document.
How a Passport Is Checked During Online Identification
In a remote check, the system analyzes a photograph or scan of the passport: it recognizes the document type, extracts the data, reads the machine-readable zone and barcodes or QR codes, checks the format and consistency of the details, looks for traces of digital editing of the image, and compares the holder’s photograph with a selfie. This is the general principle of systems of this kind — the specific characteristics and accuracy of an individual solution are not considered in this article; the material describes the limits of the technology’s capabilities as a whole. The “Document Recognition” section of the NeuroVision product solves exactly this task — analyzing a photograph, not inspecting the physical passport blank.
Online verification from a photograph does not replace physical inspection of the passport blank and cannot replace it: the watermark, ultraviolet glow, and optically variable elements are inaccessible to an ordinary camera regardless of the quality of the shot or the recognition algorithm. Successfully passing an automated check means that the document’s data are consistent, not that the blank it is printed on is physically authentic.
What to Do If a Passport Raises Doubts
A single alarming feature is a reason for a careful check, not for a conclusion of forgery: it may be explained by the year of issue of the passport blank, wear, the quality of the lighting, or the specifics of the shot.
Compare it with the other elements and with the passport blank’s year of issue before treating the document as doubtful.
A document in hand — against the light, at a different angle, or under ordinary lighting; a photograph or scan — retake it with better lighting and from a better angle. Many false suspicions are already cleared at this step.
Check the document’s data against each other and against other information presented — discrepancies in the details are more telling than the appearance of the blank.
If doubts persist, ask the person presenting the document to present it again, or to provide an additional document confirming their identity.
If the doubts are not resolved, pass the question on without drawing a conclusion yourself: in an organization, this means review by a compliance specialist or the security service under an internal procedure; for a private individual — contact a territorial MVD office or postpone the transaction until the matter is clarified, without seizing or retaining another person’s document.
Doubt about a document is a reason for additional checking, not an accusation against the person presenting it: as shown above, many outwardly unusual features have a lawful explanation.
Passport validity is a question separate from the authenticity of the passport blank: it is established by a request to the MVD register, not by inspection. The validity period depends on the holder’s age: from age 14 — until the 20th birthday, from age 20 — until the 45th birthday, from age 45 — indefinitely, and after the 20th and 45th birthdays the passport remains valid for no more than 90 more calendar days (Resolution No. 2267, paragraph 24). Apart from expiry, a passport is invalid on one of the twelve grounds of Article 9(8) of 138-FZ: these include the issue of a new passport, the death of the holder, loss, and manufacture on a forged blank. The MVD records the passport’s status and the grounds for invalidity in the “Mir” system (Resolution No. 2267, paragraph 57), and a change of status to invalid is entered within one business day — but from the day the information about invalidity is received, not from the day the ground itself arises (Resolution No. 2267, paragraph 58). For most grounds, there is no gap between these two dates: a new passport is issued by the MVD itself, and an application about loss is also accepted by it. But there are exceptions — for example, a passport is invalid from the day of the holder’s death, while the time within which this information reaches the MVD from the civil registry offices (ZAGS) is not set by regulation — and such a gap should be taken into account in a register check.
The NeuroVision service requests data through the Interagency Electronic Interaction System (SMEV 3) and shows whether the passport is listed as expired, replaced, lost, or invalid — from ₽5 per check. This check contains no decision on the physical authenticity of the passport blank — it does not resolve that question.
Checking a passport raises three different questions, and each has its own way of being answered. The authenticity of the passport blank is checked by physical inspection, but inspection answers it only one way: it makes it possible to notice a mismatch with the description and does not make it possible to confirm authenticity. A positive conclusion is given by a separate study — a technical forensic examination of documents, conducted by forensic experts. The validity of the document is established by a request to the MVD register, and whether it belongs to the person presenting it — by matching the face and the data. The official description of the blank (Resolution No. 2267) does not mention microprinting by name — it is made mandatory by a separate Ministry of Finance requirement for level “A” blanks — but it does directly describe the elements that can be compared during inspection — from the watermark to intaglio printing, and many of them require their own conditions: transmitted light, ultraviolet, or a viewing angle. From a photograph, most of them cannot be reliably assessed, and a correct machine-readable record confirms only the consistency of the record itself, not the authenticity or the validity of the document. A single unusual feature of the blank is a reason for additional checking, and a conclusion about the document is drawn from the totality of features and from which check answers which question.