Account access recovery by selfie helps return an account to its owner who has forgotten a password, changed phones or lost a second factor — instead of a call to support and a passport photo in a chat. The customer opens a one-time link, photographs a document and passes Liveness, while the platform makes sure a live person is in front of the camera and matches their face and the document data against what is known about the account. Your system decides whether to reset the password and bind a new phone.
A password and an SMS code protect the account while the owner still has them. When they are lost, the question remains: who is asking for access now? The customer passes the check on their own, and an employee steps in only for disputed cases.
The customer photographs a passport or another document with a phone camera. The platform recognises the fields and looks for signs of forgery: a photo of a screen, a printout, a pasted-in photo, traces of an editor. The document data goes to your system, and you compare it with the account data.
Liveness checks that a real person is in front of the camera, not a photo from social media, a video, a mask or a deepfake. Without this step a face check is worthless: the owner’s photo is easier to find than their password.
The face in Liveness is matched with the photo in the document. Someone else’s passport — found, bought or “borrowed” from a relative — will not work, even if it is genuine.
The decisive match is against what you knew about the customer before access was lost: the full name and date of birth from the profile or, if your lawyer allows it, their previous check. If everything matches, access can be returned.
A face check is placed where the usual recovery channel no longer works or could have been used by someone other than you.
The password reset email goes to a mailbox whose password the customer also does not remember or which was deleted long ago. Without an identity check, all that is left is correspondence with support.
The number was reassigned by the operator to another person, the SIM card was lost, the customer moved to another country. The SMS code goes to someone other than the owner — or does not arrive at all.
The phone with the code generator app broke, backup codes or a hardware key were lost. Resetting two-factor authentication is the most dangerous action in an account: after it, only the password protects it.
The owner writes that they do not recognise the email and phone in their profile. This means the takeover has already happened, and access cannot be restored via the new contacts — only via the person’s identity.
A login from another country, a mass change of settings, a withdrawal attempt. Before unblocking, you need to make sure the owner is behind the account again.
The employee to whom a seller account or corporate account was registered has left. The new administrator confirms their identity, while the company’s authority is checked separately.
A selfie proves that a live person is in front of the camera and that they are the document holder. But to return an account to them, you need to know whose account it is. So first you decide what to match against — and build the scenario from that.
At registration the customer has already passed a check or provided their full name and date of birth. During recovery they photograph a document again and pass Liveness: the face is matched with the photo in the document, and your system compares the full name, date of birth and document number with the profile. The match is against the document the customer shows now — a separate face reference is not needed. Check by passport and selfie
The new check is linked to the successful session the customer passed at registration, and the face in Liveness is matched with the face from it. You receive a “match / no match” answer without the photo and personal data. Whether this path can be used in your process is decided by your lawyer before launch.
If the customer has submitted biometrics to the Unified Biometric System (UBS), their identity is confirmed by an organisation with access to the system under the rules of Art. 16 of 572‑FZ. NeuroVision is not connected to the UBS and does not replace such identification: the platform checks the document, live presence and the face match within the session. More about the UBS and KYC
If an email and a nickname were enough at registration, a selfie will only show that a live person came with a real document, but not that the account is theirs. Here the identity check is combined with other evidence: login history, old devices, payment data — and a delay is introduced before the reset.
Six steps from “I can’t log in” to a new password. The customer passes the check on their own, your system receives the outcome and decides itself what to reset.
On the login screen there is an “I can’t log in” button or a contact-support option. Your system finds the account by login, contract number or old phone and creates a check session. If a match with the customer’s previous check is needed, it is linked before the customer opens the widget.
A customer without access to the account has nowhere to embed the widget, so the check opens via a link. The link is sent to a backup email or a support chat, or shown as a QR code on a computer. The link lifetime is from 15 minutes to 30 days, and the number of opens is limited.
The customer photographs a passport or another document within the frame on the screen. The platform recognises the fields, checks the document for forgery and, if enabled in the scenario, — the validity of the passport against databases.
The customer moves their face closer to the camera following on-screen prompts. The platform makes sure a live person is in front of the camera, not a photo, a screen, a mask or a video, and looks for signs of a deepfake and for extraneous faces.
The face in Liveness is compared with the photo in the document and, if you chose this path, with the face from the customer’s previous check. If it is another person’s face, the session immediately gets the “suspicious” status and is closed.
The outcome arrives via the API and a webhook together with the document data. Your system compares them with the profile, resets the password, unbinds the old phone or second factor and notifies the previous contacts. Doubtful cases go to a support employee. Session outcome rules
The fraudster knows the full name, date of birth and recent transactions from leaks and answers security questions with confidence. A face check does not depend on what can be learned about a person.
With a forged power of attorney or with the help of a mobile shop employee, the fraudster gets a new SIM card with the victim’s number and all SMS codes. A reset by face does not need a phone number.
A printed photo, a screenshot from a tablet or a video from stories. Liveness rejects such presentation attacks: printouts, screens, masks and video recordings.
The owner’s face is overlaid on the fraudster’s face, or a generated image is fed into the camera. The platform looks for signs of generation and face substitution in the frame.
The owner’s purchased or stolen passport. The document will pass the forgery check, but the face in Liveness will not match the photo in it — and the session will become suspicious.
The fraudster persuades the owner themselves to pass the check “to cancel a transfer”. The face will match, so after the check a cooling-off period and a notification to the old contacts are needed — more on them below.
Cracking a password takes a long time. It is much easier to convince a service that the password is lost and ask for a new one. Here is what happens most often — and which of these a face check stops.
More about how deepfakes and face substitution are detected is on the page about deepfake protection in verification.
Four groups of checks in one session. Each line is what you will see in the outcome and in the personal account.
A new password, unbinding the old phone and second factor, signing out of the account on all devices, revoking app keys and tokens. If the account has already been taken over, the fraudster must not stay inside through a forgotten session.
An email or push notification to the old email and devices: “Access was restored after an identity check. If this was not you — reply to this email.” The real owner, whose account someone is trying to steal, learns about it immediately.
For the first hours or day after recovery, restrict withdrawals, changes of bank details and the addition of new payees. This is the last barrier for the scenario in which the owner passes the check themselves under the fraudster’s dictation.
The session ID, time, outcome and reason for rejection remain in the check log. If the owner disputes the recovery, you will show who passed the check and when — and you set the image retention period in the scenario and do not keep them longer than necessary.
A face check answers the question of who has come. What to allow in the account after that is decided by your system — and these rules determine whether a fraudster manages to take the takeover through to the money.
When and how to re-verify customers without losing conversion — in the article “Repeated KYC”. Suspicious operations after recovery are caught by fraud monitoring.
A failed check must not cut the owner off from the account for good. Each reason has its own next step.
The session is closed as suspicious. Recovery on this request is stopped, the account is flagged and the review is passed to the security team. A repeat link for the same request is not issued.
An old camera, poor light, glare from glasses. The platform will suggest what to fix; if that does not help, offer to pass the check from another phone via a QR code. The reasons for failures are on the page about passport and selfie verification.
Expired, of a different type, not the one specified in the profile. Ask the customer to photograph a document whose data is in the account, or a second document.
The reference session has no face or confirmed document. Then recovery goes by the document and profile data, without matching against the previous check.
The session is closed after the last failed attempt, the link — when it expires. A new one is issued on a new request, and frequent repeats are a signal to take a closer look.
Refusing biometrics cannot be a reason to refuse service. Keep a path without a face: a visit to the office, a video call with an employee or a document check with a delay before the reset. It must not be easier than the path with a face.
A face image used to confirm identity is biometric personal data. Below is a summary of the rules as of October 2026: a guide for a conversation with your lawyer, not a legal opinion.
Everywhere an account holds money, correspondence, reputation or the right to act on a person’s behalf.
The price is per KYC session with all steps and attempts. There are usually few recovery requests, so you can take a package shared with customer registration.
Document and document anti-fraud, Liveness, deepfake and face substitution detection, face-to-document photo matching. The document data goes to your system for matching against the profile.
from 13 ₽ per session
Liveness without a document — for customers whose previous check can be used as a reference.
5 ₽ per check
Passport validity and other database checks added to the session — for example, so as not to return an account on an invalid document.
“Document + liveness” in the price matrix table — 33 ₽ at 10 000 sessions a year, 30 ₽ at 50 000, 27 ₽ at 100 000; “Liveness check” in the calculator — 15 / 14 / 13 ₽. The first month is a free trial, and you pay only for completed checks. For an exact calculation, see — the calculator in the price matrix.
Terms you will meet when discussing the scenario with the security team, support and your lawyer.
How face recognition, Liveness and passport checking work in KYC — in our blog
A customer who cannot log in receives a one-time link, photographs a document and passes Liveness. The platform checks the document for forgery, makes sure a live person is in front of the camera and matches their face with the photo in the document. Your system compares the document data with the profile and, if everything matches, resets the password or second factor.
A support employee checks what can be learned about a person: full name, date of birth, recent transactions. This data appears in leaks. A face and document check does not depend on knowledge and runs without a queue.
Only partially. A selfie will show that a live person came with a real document, but will not prove that the account is theirs. If the profile has a full name and date of birth — compare them with the document. If not — combine the check with login history and payment data and introduce a delay before the reset.
Technically yes: the new session is linked to the customer’s successful session, and you receive a “match / no match” answer without the photo and personal data. Whether this path is permissible under 572‑FZ in your process is assessed by your lawyer before launch.
Liveness rejects printouts, screens, masks and video recordings. The platform also looks for signs of a deepfake and face substitution. If the face belongs to another person, the session is closed as suspicious.
Reset the password, unbind the old phone and second factor, end sessions on all devices, notify the previous contacts about the recovery and temporarily restrict withdrawals and changes of bank details.
Via a one-time link: it is sent to a backup email or a support chat, or shown as a QR code on a computer. The link lives from 15 minutes to 30 days, and the number of opens is limited.
Refusing biometrics cannot be a reason to refuse service (part 13, Art. 3 of 572‑FZ). Keep a path without a face — a visit to the office, a video call with an employee or a document check with a delay — and make it no easier than the path with a face.
“Document + liveness” — from 29 ₽ per session with all attempts; “Liveness check” without a document — from 13 ₽; passport validity check — 5 ₽. The first month is a free trial. The calculation is in the price matrix.
You set the session data retention period in the scenario, and a customer’s personal data can be deleted from all their sessions with a single request. Where the data is processed is determined by the contract.
Tell us how customers recover access now and whether you verified them at registration — we will suggest what to match the selfie against and calculate the price.
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Book a callThe NeuroVision platform is listed in the Russian software registry, entry no. 19972. Rospatent certificate no. 2023661508.
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